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The Scheduling of Judicial Elections in Odd-
Numbered Years: Has Sprague Resolved the Issue?
I. INTRODUCTION
In the April, 1988, primary election, the voters of Pennsylvania
selected the democratic and republican party nominees for the of-
fices of supreme court justice and superior court judge. However,
none of these candidates ever assumed office because the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court, in Sprague v. Casey,1 cancelled the Novem-
ber, 1988, general election for these judicial positions. The validity
of the 1988 judicial elections was questioned2 because the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution appeared to require that justices and judges,
who are elected state-wide, be selected in odd-numbered years3
and not during the general elections held in even-numbered years."
Richard Sprague, in his capacities as a registered voter and a
taxpayer of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, filed an action
against Pennsylvania Governor Robert Casey.' The Pennsylvania
1. 550 A.2d 184 (1988).
2. The constitutional validity of the elections was originally raised in a May 23, 1988,
article of the Pennsylvania Law Journal authored by Duquesne University Law Professor
Bruce Ledewitz. See Ledewitz, 11 PA. L.J. RPm. No. 47, at 3-4 (May 23, 1988). Subse-
quently, Ledewitz's article reached the attention of the Philadelphia Inquirer which in turn
published an article concerning the 1988 judicial elections. Thereafter the article was read
by Richard Sprague, a Pennsylvania attorney. Justice Nicholas P. Papadakos of the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court also questioned the validity of the election in a Temple Law Re-
view article. See Justice Papadakos, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Review, 61 TEMPLE L.
REV. - (1988).
3. Article V is titled "The Judiciary." Section 13(a) states: "Justices, judges and jus-
tices of the peace shall be elected at the municipal election next preceding the commence-
ment of their respective terms of office by the electors of the Commonwealth or the respec-
tive districts in which they are to serve." PA. CONST. art. V, § 13(a) (emphasis added).
A municipal election is defined as "[t]he election held on the first Tuesday following the
first Monday in November in each odd-numbered year." 46 P.S. § 601(72) (Purdon 1968)
(emphasis added).
4. A general election is defined as "[tihe election held on the Tuesday next following
the first Monday in November in each even-numbered year." 46 P.S. § 601(44) (Purdon
1968) (emphasis added).
5. Sprague, 550 A.2d at 184. Also named as defendants were James J. Haggerty, Sec-
retary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; William Boehm, Commissioner of the Bureau
of Legislation, Commissions and Elections; Allen Ertel, Democratic Party nominee for the
office of Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; Anita B. Brody, Republican Party
nominee for the office of Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; Walter M. Cohen,
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Supreme Court in Sprague6 held that the vacancies on the su-
preme and superior courts occurring as a result of resignations can
not be filled by an election in an even-numbered year.7 Thus, the
democratic and republican party nominees, who expended a signif-
icant amount of campaign funds in the 1988 primary, 8 were denied
an opportunity to capture judicial positions in the 1988 general
election.
The following comment will trace the evolution of case law con-
cerning the constitutional validity of holding judicial elections in
even-numbered years. This comment will also examine the active
role Chief Justice Nix played in influencing supreme court deci-
sions which resolved judicial election issues. Finally, this comment
will discuss the ramifications of the Sprague decision, the issues it
leaves unanswered, and possible methods for resolving those out-
standing questions in a manner consistent with the Sprague case.
II. REVIEW OF CASE LAW CONCERNING THE ABILITY OR INABILITY
TO HOLD JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN EVEN-NUMBERED YEARS
Article V, section 13(a) of the Pennsylvania Constitution,
adopted as an amendment to the constitution in 1968, altered the
judicial election process by requiring justices and judges to be
elected in odd-numbered years." However, Article VII, section 3,
added to the Pennsylvania Constitution in 1874, permits judicial
elections to be held in even-numbered years.10 Not surprisingly,
Republican Party nominee for the office of Judge of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania;
and Catherine Ford-Elliott, Democratic Party nominee for the office of Judge of the Supe-
rior Court of Pennsylvania. Id.
6. Id. Sprague instituted an action in commonwealth court; however, pursuant to the
exercise of plenary jurisdiction, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court listed the case for argu-
ment. Id. at 186. On September 19, 1988, the court entered a per curiam order requiring
that the candidates' names be removed from the ballot. Id.
7. Id. at 191.
8. Campaign expenditures were reported as follows: Republican Supreme Court can-
didate, Anita Brody $255,331; Democratic Supreme Court candidate, Allen Ertel $33,533;
Democratic Superior Court nominee Catherine Ford-Elliott $17,527; Republican Superior
Court candidate Walter Cohen $7,775. See Maher, 11 PA. L.J. RPTR. 1 (Oct. 3, 1988).
9. See supra note 3.
10. Article VII is titled "Elections." Section 3 states:
All judges elected by the electors of the State at large may be elected at either a
general or municipal election, as circumstances may require. All elections for judges
of the courts for the several judicial districts, and for county, city, ward, borough, and
township officers, for regular terms of service, shall be held on the municipal election
day; namely, the Tuesday next following the first Monday of November in each odd-
numbered year, but the General Assembly may by law fix a different day, two-thirds
of all the members of each House consenting thereto: Provided, judges for the courts
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the state courts of Pennsylvania faced the problem of interpreting
the 1968 amendment to the constitution in harmony with not only
Article VII, section 3, but also the constitutional framers' intent
and the other sections of the Judiciary Article.11 One of the first
cases to interpret the impact of Article V, section 13(a) was Bar-
bieri v. Shapp.12
Pennsylvania Superior Court Judge William Cercone was elected
on November 5, 1968, and took office on January 6, 1969; thus, his
ten year term1" was scheduled to expire in January, 1979."1 In Bar-
bieri I, the supreme court considered whether Judge Cercone's
term should be extended one year, until 1980, so that his retention
election would occur in 1979.11 Otherwise, the judge's term would
conclude in an odd-numbered year and his retention election
would occur in an even-numbered year, apparently in violation of
Article V, section 13(a).1 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's deci-
sion centered on the application of section 2 of the Schedule to
Article V.
17
Judge Cercone contended that section 2 of the Schedule to Arti-
cle V applied to the superior court seat, and therefore his commis-
of the several judicial districts holding office at the present time, whose terms of office
may end in an odd-numbered year, shall continue to hold their offices until the first
Monday of January in the next succeeding even-numbered year.
PA. CONST. art. VII, § 3. General elections in Pennsylvania are held in even numbered years.
Id.
11. Article V of the Pennsylvania Constitution is titled "The Judiciary" and discusses,
for example, qualifications, terms, and vacancies of justices, judges and justices of the peace.
See generally PA. CONST. art. V.
12. 470 Pa. 463, 368 A.2d 721 (1977). The plurality decision was written by Chief Jus-
tice Jones. Id. at 464-69, 368 A.2d at 722-25. Justice Nix filed a concurring opinion Id. at
470-77, 368 A.2d at 725-29. Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Pom-
eroy joined. Id. at 477-83, 368 A.2d at 729-32. For a discussion of the dissenting opinion, see
infra note 30.
13. "The regular term of office of justices and judges shall be ten years..." PA. CONST.
art. V, § 15(a).
14. Barbieri 1, 470 Pa. at 465, 368 A.2d at 722.
15. Id.
16. See supra note 3. Section,13(a) requires judicial elections take place during munic-
ipal elections which are always held in odd-numbered years. Id.
17. PA. CONST. art. V, Schedule § 2. When the Pennsylvania Constitution was amended
in 1968, it made provisions for the smooth transition from the old constitution to the new
constitution by providing "schedules" to adjust the terms of elected judicial officers so that
their terms would conform with the new constitution. Barbieri I, 470 Pa. at 465, 368 A.2d at
722. The § 2 Schedule provides that "[t]he present terms of all judges of the Superior Court
which would otherwise expire on the first Monday of January in an odd-numbered year
shall be extended to expire in the even-numbered year next following." PA. CONST. art. V,
Schedule § 2 (emphasis added). The Schedule has "the same force and effect" as the consti-
tution. PA. CONST. art. V, Schedule (1968).
1989
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sion should continue until the first Monday of January 1980.18 Any
extension of the judicial term was opposed by Pennsylvania Gover-
nor Milton J. Shapp,19 and Commonwealth Secretary C. Delores
Tucker,20 who had previously refused to voluntarily extend Cer-
cone's term.2 Shapp and Tucker asserted before the supreme
court that Judge Cercone's commission was not a "present" term
capable of being extended because his induction was on January 6,
1969, and the effective date for Article V, section 13(a) and section
2 of the Schedule to Article V was January 1, 1969.22
In Barbieri I, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a two Justice
plurality opinion, held that Judge Cercone's term should be ex-
tended until the first Monday of January 1980, and that he need
not run for retention until the municipal election in 1979.25 In in-
terpreting the word "present" for Schedule section 2, the court ex-
amined the framers' intent and concluded that "present" "is not
confined to terms of superior court judges which existed or were in
effect on the single day of January 1, 1969, but includes,... terms
which commenced after the effective date of the new Constitu-
tion. '24 The plurality reached their conclusion by a process of
elimination, rejecting retention elections in the even-numbered
year of 1978 as inconsistent with the intent of the framers.25
Justice Nix concurred with the plurality's decision that Judge
Cercone need not run for retention until the 1979 municipal elec-
tion; however, he chastised the plurality for extending their power
by altering a judicial term without "express constitutional author-
ity.112 According to Justice Nix, without the authorization of sec-
18. Barbieri I, 470 Pa. at 466, 368 A.2d at 722-23.
19. Article IV, Section 19, states: "All commissions shall be in the name and by au-
thority of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and be sealed with the State seal and signed
by the Governor." PA. CONST. art. IV, § 19.
20. The Secretary of the Commonwealth must "prepare and issue with the approval of
the Governor," the elected officer's [judge's] Commissions. Act of April 9, 1929, P.L. 177,
Art. VIII, § 809, 71 P.S. § 279 (1962).
21. Barbieri I, 470 Pa. at 466, 368 A.2d at 723.
22. Id. at 467, 368 A.2d at 723-24.
23. Id. at 469, 368 A.2d at 725. Article V, § 15(b) of the constitution directs when
retention elections for state-wide judicial officers will be held in Pennsylvania. Section 15(b)
states that "[i]f a justice or judge files a declaration [for retention], his name shall be sub-
mitted to the electors . . . at the municipal election immediately preceding the expiration
of the term of office of the justice or judge to determine only the question whether he shall
be retained in office." PA. CONST. art. V, § 15(b) (emphasis added).
24. Barbieri I, 470 Pa. at 467-68, 368 A.2d at 724.
25. Id. The court also rejected the alternative of holding the retention election in 1977,
fourteen months before Judge Cercone's ten-year term was to expire. Id.
26. Id. at 470, 368 A.2d at 725. While agreeing with the result reached in the plurality
Vol. 27:557
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tion 2 of the Schedule to Article V, the supreme court would lack
the power to extend the term of a superior court judge to conform
with the judicial retention requirements of the constitution.2 7 Jus-
tice Nix asserted that the plurality and dissenting opinions failed
"to recognize the interrelationship between Section 2 and the or-
derly transition of this Commonwealth to the process of judicial
retention. '28  Further, recognizing that the framers' intent in
adopting the election Schedule was to harmonize the transition to
retention elections, Justice Nix stated that the narrow purpose of
Schedule, section 2 was to "extend by one year the term of office of
any Superior Court judge elected to a term established under a
prior constitution in order to render the judge's term of office com-
patible with the new election provision established by amend-
ments." '29 Therefore, the Schedule "was intended to be no more
than a stop-gap measure" for the purpose of aligning the judicial
term "with the newly added constitutional requirement that they
stand for an election in an odd-numbered year . . .,0
opinion, Justice Nix criticized its reasoning because "it fails to emphasize the limited scope
of this Schedule provision [section 2 of Article V] and, implicitly suggests, albeit uninten-
tionally, that this Court has the power, absent express constitutional authority, to extend a
constitutionally mandated judicial term of office." Id. (emphasis in original).
27. Id. at 726. Justice Nix contended that "it is clear that if we had not embraced
within this jurisdiction the concept of the retention election with the adoption of the new
Judiciary Article [in 1968], there would have been no pressing need for a 6rovision such as
Section 2." Id.
28. Id. at 472, 368 A.2d at 726. Justice Nix reasoned that:
Absent some authorization to extend the term, it would be impossible to preserve the
right of the incumbent jurist to an uncontested, non-partisan retention election. Sec-
tion 2 thus arose from the need to make the retention process applicable to Superior
Court Judges who were formerly elected to office in an even-numbered year.
Id. at 474, 368 A.2d at 727 (emphasis in original).
29. Id. Justice Nix also rebutted the dissent's theory, see infra note 30, that Judge
Cercone's term was not a "present" term. Id. at 475, 368 A.2d at 728. Justice Nix reasoned
that if the dissent's construction had been accurate, one of the seven superior court judges
would be elected in an even-numbered year. Id. Thus, Justice Nix concluded that the dis-
sent's rationale:
[D]oes not effectuate the constitutional scheme, but subverts it. If the view espoused
by the dissenting justice were adopted by this Court, we would be required to disre-
gard the express mandate of Article V, Section 13(a) and Article VII, Section 3, that
all judges be elected in an odd-numbered year.
Id. at 476, 368 A.2d at 728.
30. Id. at 477, 368 A.2d at 729. Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion in Barbieri I
which Justice Pomeroy joined. Id. at 477-83, 368 A.2d at 729-32. In dissent, Justice Roberts
asserted that Judge Cercone's term should not be extended, but instead his term should
expire at the end of his fixed ten-year term, with a retention election in 1978. Id. at 47§, 368
A.2d at 729. Justice Roberts reasoned that the new judiciary Article V and the schedule
were effective as of January 1, 1969, but Judge Cercone's term did not commence until
January 6, 1969. Id. at 479, 368 A.2d at 730. Thus, Judge Cercone's term was not in exis-
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A year later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Barbieri v.
Shapp 1 addressed the issue of whether court of common pleas
judgeships should be filled either by gubernatorial appointment32
or by election when the judges reached mandatory retirement age3s
in an odd-numbered year.3 4 In a per curiam order, the court di-
rected that the vacancies created by the mandatory retirement age
be filled by a municipal election.3 5 Justice Roberts, writing for the
majority, 6 concluded that the gubernatorial appointment power of
Article V, section 13(b) was not intended to be utilized when va-
cancies are created by foreseeable events, such as mandatory re-
tirement.3 7 Consonant with this interpretation, the court reasoned
that the intent of section 13(b) was to apply it only as a "stopgap
to fill seats that unexpectedly fall vacant."3 " The court reasoned
that an election to fill a vacancy created by a judge forced to retire
could be anticipated by the public, as well as potential candidates,
and all involved would have sufficient notice to prepare for an up-
coming election. 9 To allow the governor's selections to stand, ac-
tence at the "present" as required by section 2 of the Schedule. Id.
Further, Justice Roberts contended that holding an "election in an even-numbered year
does less violence to the constitutional framework than extending a constitutionally estab-
lished term of office or holding an election more than a year before a judge's term expires."
Id. at 482, 368 A.2d at 731. Therefore, the election should be held in an even-numbered
year, since the court can "exercise the choice" mandated by Article VII, § 3 when, as here,
the "circumstances may require." Id.
31. 476 Pa. 513, 383 A.2d 218 (1978). Justice Roberts filed the opinion for the major-
ity. Id. at 517, 383 A.2d at 220. Justices Manderino and Nix dissented. Id. at 524, 383 A.2d
at 224.
32. In accordance with Article V, § 13(b), a vacant judicial seat may be filled by guber-
natorial appointment. Article V, § 13(b) states:
A vacancy in the office of justice, judge or justice of the peace shall be filled by ap-
pointment by the Governor .... The person so appointed shall serve for a term end-
ing on the first Monday of January following the next municipal election more than
ten months after the vacancy occurs or for the remainder of the unexpired term
whichever is less. ...
PA. CONST. art V, § 13(b) (emphasis added).
33. Mandatory retirement age for justices, judges, and justices of the peace is 70 years
of age. PA. CONST. art. V, § 16(b).
34. Barbieri 11, 476 Pa. at 518, 383 A.2d at 220.
35. Barbieri v. Shapp, 474 Pa. 613, 379 A.2d 534 (1977). The supreme court per curiam
order reversed a decision of the commonwealth court, Barbieri v. Shapp, 29 Pa. Commw.
594, 372 A.2d 939 (1977), and "directed that each of the above [court of common pleas]
judicial offices be filled by election at the November 8, 1977, municipal election." 474 Pa. at
614, 379 A.2d at 535.
36. Barbieri H, 476 Pa. at 517, 383 A.2d at 220. Justice Roberts' opinion was issued
subsequently to the per curian order.
37. Id. at 521, 383 A.2d at 222.
38. Id.
39. Id. "Vacancies are to be filled by appointment only when there is insufficient time
562
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cording to the majority, would contravene the intention of the
framers of the constitution and the people of the commonwealth
that judges be elected, not appointed."
Justice Manderino, in a dissent joined by Justice Nix, criticized
the majority for ignoring the plain meaning of Article V, section
13(b). 41 The dissent broadly interpreted the term "vacancy" as oc-
curring whenever "an incumbent dies, resigns, retires, or is re-
moved from office."'42 As evidence of the accuracy of his interpreta-
tion of "vacancy," Justice Manderino noted that the unrebutted
comments of the delegates on the floor of the Constitutional Con-
vention paralleled his own reasoning. 43 Thus, Justice Manderino,
with Justice Nix's support, concluded that a foreseeable event, in-
cluding mandatory retirement, still creates a "vacancy" and must
be filled by gubernatorial appointment pursuant to section 13(b).44
Barbieri v. Thornburgh,4 s another case interpreting Article V,
sections 13(a),"4 (b), 47 and 15(a), 48 addressed the issue of whether a
judicial seat which becomes vacant in an odd-numbered year, as a
to hold an election." Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 525, 383 A.2d at 224. Justice Manderino argued that the majority was ignor-
ing "well settled principles of constitutional interpretation" and reading "into Section 13(b)
an exception [for judicial vacancies that may be anticipated by mandatory retirement]
which is neither explicit nor implicit in the language of Section 13(b)." Id.
42. Id. at 525, 383 A.2d at 225.
43. Id. A delegate to the 1967 Constitutional Convention stated: "I think the facts
should not be debatable in any way that when a judge dies a vacancy occurs, when a judge
resigns, a vacancy occurs, and when he has retired .... the vacancy occurs at a given day."
Debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1967-68, Vol. II, at 1085-86 (remarks of Dele-
gate Barron) (emphasis added by Justice Manderino). The Barron Amendment passed by a
vote of 68 yeas and 65 nays. Id. at 1091. As a delegate to the 1967-68 Constitutional Conven-
tion, Justice Manderino voted against the amendment. Id.
44. Barbieri 11, 476 Pa. at 526, 383 A.2d at 225. The dissenters also used examples to
highlight their opposition to the majority's conclusion. The dissenters stated that:
[I]f one were to reach mandatory retirement age on January 1 of 1979, or in July of
1978, or February of 1978, the next preceding municipal election would be the munic-
ipal election of 1977, just as is the case for mandatory retirements occurring in 1977.
The absurdity of this interpretation is obvious: at the municipal election in 1977, the
people will be electing judges some of whom will take office in 1978, some of whom
will of necessity have to wait until as late as 1979 to take office. Such a result simply
could not have been intended.
Id. at 528-29, 383 A.2d at 226.
45. 42 Pa. Commw. 1, 400 A.2d 653 (1979). President Judge Bowman wrote the opin-
ion for the majority. Id. at 3-10, 400 A.2d at 654-57. Judge Crumlish filed a dissenting opin-
ion. Id. at 10-16, 400 A.2d at 657-60.
46. See supra note 3.
47. See supra note 32.
48. Article V, § 15(a) states that "[t]he regular term of office of justices and judges
shall be ten years .. " PA. CONST. art. V, § 15(a).
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result of the official expiration of a term, should be filled by guber-
natorial appointment until the next municipal election pursuant to
section 13(b). The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court examined
four alternative solutions for the interpretation of the 1968 Consti-
tution,"' and concluded that the fourth alternative, electing the
new justice at the municipal election of 1981, should be adopted. 1
The court ordered that the elected official should take office in
January 1982, and the governor should exercise his power pursuant
to Article V, section 13(b) and appoint a qualified individual to the
bench during the interim period from January, 1981, the expira-
tion of Chief Justice Eagen's term, until January, 1982.52
The Thornburgh court reasoned that the fourth alternative of
holding an election in 1981 represented a solution which would sat-
isfy the mandate of Article V, section 13(a).53 Further, the court
found that its solution "would solve the problem for the future,
would normalize the time span between one's election and the as-
sumption of office, and would synchronize such election within the
general framework of the election of all judges as set forth in Arti-
cle V. 5' Although the court recognized that allowing a gubernato-
rial appointee to serve on the supreme court from January of 1981
to January of 1982 was contrary to the public policy of electing
judges, the commonwealth court noted that the constitution of
1968 specifically provided for situations when the gubernatorial ap-
pointment power was operative as a result of a judicial vacancy. 55
49. Thornburgh, 42 Pa. Commw. at 3, 400 A.2d at 654. Chief Justice Michael J. Ea-
gen's term, at issue in Thornburgh, was set to officially expire in January of 1981. Chief
Justice Eagen was elected in 1959 to serve a twenty-one year term. Id. at 4, 400 A.2d at 655.
Prior to 1968, the Pennsylvania Constitution permitted judges and justices to be elected in
either general elections (even-numbered years) or municipal elections (odd-numbered
years). Id. Subsequently, Article V, § 13 altered the language so that judicial elections oc-
curred only during municipal elections. Id.
50. The Court Administrator suggested the following four alternative solutions:
(1) Election in 1979 with the winner to take office in 1981;
(2) Election in 1980 with the winner to take office in 1981;
(3) Election in 1981 with the Chief Justice to hold over for a year;
(4) Election in 1981 with the Governor's appointee filling the gap in that election
year.
Id. at 6, 400 A.2d at 655.
51. Id. at 9, 400 A.2d at 657. The commonwealth court stated that "we conclude the
fourth alternative should prevail." Id.
52. Id. at 10, 400 A.2d at 656-57.
53. Id. at 9, 400 A.2d at 656. The court determined that scheduling the election in
1981 would "meet the explicit constitutional mandate that the election of justices shall be
held in municipal election (odd-numbered) years." Id.
54. Id. at 9, 400 A.2d at 657.
55. Id. The commonwealth court pointed out that "the Constitution of 1968 recognizes
Vol. 27:557
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The court disregarded alternatives one, two, and three for vari-
ous reasons.5 6 Alternative two, holding an election in 1980 with the
successor to assume office in 1981, was eliminated because the so-
lution was contrary to the specifics of Article V, section 13(a),
which requires judicial elections to be held in odd-numbered years,
and would perpetuate the even-numbered year problem since jus-
tices are elected to ten-year terms.57 With little elaboration, the
court stated that alternative three, holding an election in 1981 and
extending the chief justice's term for an additional year, was inap-
plicable because such a solution "would be a judicial usurpation of
power without constitutional support" and "is contrary to a long-
standing principle that a court is without power to extend consti-
tutionally fixed terms of judicial office."'58 The court found alterna-
tive one, election in 1979 with the successor to assume office in
1981, unsupportable because it provided for greater than a year
interim between election and assumption of office. 59 Relying on
Barbieri I, the court articulated that such a solution contravenes
the "public policy concern that such long intervals should be
avoided." 60
In Cavanaugh v. Davis,61 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court again
addressed the apparent conflict in the commonwealth's constitu-
tion between Article VII, section 3 and Article V, section 13(a).62
The issue before the court was whether the general election of No-
vember, 1982, presented a constitutionally permissible time to fill a
seat on the state supreme court" that would become vacant at the
that vacancies in judicial office will occur-under circumstances in which the election process
must necessarily be conducted at some future time." Id.
56. Id. at 9, 400 A.2d at 655-57.
57. Id. at 8-9, 400 A.2d at 655-56. The court also noted that in Barbieri I, "former
Chief Justice Jones (plurality opinion) concluded that Section 13(a), Article V, providing
that justices and judges shall be elected in municipal election years supersedes and prevails
over the provisions of Section 3, Article VII, authorizing such elections in municipal or gen-
eral election years as the circumstances may require." Id. at 9, 400 A.2d at 656.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. The commonwealth court found that the Barbieri I decision had reasoned that
"a fourteen month interval between the election and the assumption of office . . .was
against public policy." Id.
61. 497 Pa. 351, 440 A.2d 1380 (1982). The majority opinion was written by Justice
Roberts and joined by Chief Justice O'Brien and Justices Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott and
Hutchinson. Id. at 352-58, 440 A.2d at 1381-84. A dissenting opinion was filed by Justice
Nix. Id. at 358-66, 440 A.2d at 1384-88.
62. Id. at 353, 440 A.2d at 1381. The supreme court noted that Article VII, § 3 was
adopted in 1874, while Article V, § 13(a) was more recently approved in 1968. Id.
63. Henry X. O'Brien, then Chief Justice, decided not to seek retention and was vol-
1989 565
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expiration of a sitting justice's twenty-one year term on January 3,
1983.2 The court concluded that the position could be filled at the
November, 1982, general election. 5
The Cavanaugh court construed the language of Article VII, sec-
tion 3 and Article V, section 13(a) together since both sections re-
late to judicial elections, and reasoned that two classes of judges
exist: state and locally elected judges, each of which is to be
treated differently." Without exception, the court noted that all
"locally elected judges are to be chosen at municipal elections."67
The court, finding an exception for judges elected state-wide,
stated that ordinarily members of the bench are chosen in odd-
numbered years; however, Article VII section 3 provides for elec-
tion during even-numbered years "as circumstances may re-
quire."' " Applying the exception, the court reasoned that when a
term of a state-wide officer expires in an odd-numbered year, "cir-
cumstances ... require that the succeeding justice be elected at a
general election." ' This conclusion was consistent with the consti-
tutionally mandated preference for judicial elections rather than
gubernatorial appointments.7 °
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also stated that it was unper-
suaded by either the Thornburgh decision 71 or Commonwealth
untarily retired at the expiration of his twenty-one year term. Id.
64. Id. William Davis, the Secretary of the Commonwealth, "refused to certify the seat
for election in 1982, on the basis of his belief that an election for the seat may not be held
until the municipal election of 1983." Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 353-54, 440 A.2d at 1381-82. Davis contended, however, that because Article
VII preceded Article V, Article V's provision calling for a municipal election should super-
sede Article VII, which permits "either a general or municipal election, as circumstances
may require." Thus, Davis "would have the seat filled from January 1983 to January 1984
by gubernatorial appointment and Senate confirmation, if it is to be filled at all." Id. at 353,
400 A.2d at 1381.
67. Id. at 354, 400 A.2d at 1382.
68. Id. See supra note 10.
69. Cavanaugh, 497 Pa. at 354, 440 A.2d at 1382.
70. Id. The court stated that the preference for election "would be defeated if a va-
cancy occurring at the end of a fixed term in a state-wide judicial office were to be filled by
appointment simply because that vacancy, as here, occurs in an odd-numbered, rather than
an even-numbered, year." Id. The court also found that "whenever possible, judicial officers
shall be elected by a complete electorial process." Id. (quoting Berardocco v. Colden, 469 Pa.
452, 459, 366 A.2d 574, 576 (1976)). See also Barbieri v. Shapp, 476 Pa. 513, 520, 383 A.2d
218, 222 (1978).
71. Cavanaugh, 497 Pa. at 386, 440 A.2d at 1383. For details of the Thornburgh case,
which held that a judicial vacancy created by a natural expiration of a judicial term should
be filled by gubernatorial appointment until the next municipal election, see supra notes 45-
60 and accompanying text. The Cavanaugh court stated that the Thornburgh decision "was
never appealed to this Court, is at odds with our holding today, and is expressly disap-
1989 Judicial Elections
Secretary Davis' contention that Article V, section 13(a) super-
sedes Article VII, section 3V' Instead, the court relied upon the
reasoning of Barbieri IF3 to conclude that when the expiration of a
justice's term is easily ascertainable, and sufficient notice to pre-
pare for the election is available, a judicial election can be held in
an even-numbered year.7 '
Justice Nix, in an extensive dissent, accused the majority of "an
arrogant assumption of power" and a "blatant disregard" of the
constitutional mandate of Article V, section 13(a), which requires
that justices of the supreme court "shall be elected at municipal
elections. '75 Justice Nix chastised the majority for not interpreting
Article V, section 13(a) in conjunction with Article VII, section 3 so
that the two provisions could exist in harmony.7 6 The dissent dis-
agreed with the majority's treatment of Article V, section 13(a) as
"a general rule" that elections be held in odd-numbered years, and
Article VII, section 3 as "a specific rule" that elections may be held
in any year, as circumstances require.7 7 Instead, Justice Nix con-
tended that Article VII refers to "the general subject of elections
of public officials," while Article V, section 13(a) specifically deals
with the election of judicial officers.78 Thus, Article V controlled
judicial elections and mandated that they only occur during odd-
numbered years.
79
proved." Cavanaugh, 497 Pa. at 356, 440 A.2d at 1383.
72. Id. at 356-57, 440 A.2d at 1382-83. Davis relied upon a footnote in the plurality
opinion of Barbieri I which stated that when "read and construed together, it is clear that
the more recent amendment [Article V, § 13] supersedes and prevails over the older, general
provision [Article VII, § 3]." Id. at 355, 440 A.2d at 1382 (quoting Barbieri v. Shapp, 470 Pa.
463, 468 n.6, 368 A.2d 721, 724 n.6 (1977)). The Cavanaugh majority disagreed with Davis,
and responded that the Barbieri I "statement is neither precedential nor persuasive author-
ity. . . . Moreover, the observation of former Chief Justice Jones' [plurality opinion] over-
looks the fact that the two constitutional provisions in dispute can be construed as compati-
ble, and thus must be so construed." Cavanaugh, 497 Pa. at 355-56, 440 A.2d at 1382-83.
73. See supra notes 31-44 and accompanying text.
74. Cavanaugh, 497 Pa. at 357, 440 A.2d at 1383.
75. Id. at 358-59, 440 A.2d at 1384 (emphasis in original). For a quotation of the lan-
guage in Article V, § 13(a), see supra note 3.
76. Cavanaugh, 497 Pa. at 359, 440 A.2d at 1384-85. "A reading of the two provisions
in a proper historical prospective indicates that these provisions are in fact in harmony and
attempt to achieve the same basis objective." Id.
77. Id. at 360, 440 A.2d at 1385. Justice Nix contended that "[a] characterization [by
the majority] that Article V, § 13(a) provides only a 'general rule'. is intellectually dishon-
est." Id.
78. Id. The dissent claimed that "[t]he language [of Article V, § 13(a)] specifically
mandated that Justices of the Supreme Court, as well as all other judges and district jus-
tices, to be elected in odd years." Id. (emphasis in original).
79. Id.
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In reference to the majority's holding that the first sentence of
Article VII, section 3 permits elections to be held in even-num-
bered years, Justice Nix responded that when Article VII, section 3
is read as a whole, it clearly reflects the public policy that judicial
elections take place in odd-numbered years.80 In addition, the dis-
sent reasoned that Article VII does not recommend that judges
should be elected during general elections, but only states that
candidates may be elected, as circumstances require.8 Justice Nix
traced the "circumstance" language of Article VII, section 3 back
to a 1909 amendment to Article VIII, section 3 of the common-
wealth's 1874 Constitution.82 He reasoned that the "circumstance"
of section 3 was a response to the anticipated problem that twenty-
one year terms might expire in an odd-numbered year and require
an election in an even-numbered year.83 However, in examining Ar-
ticle VII, section 3 in its entirety, Justice Nix claimed that a pref-
erence existed for judicial elections taking place in odd-numbered
years.8 4 In addition, he contended that once the justice's terms
were reduced from twenty-one to ten years, the "circumstance"
that provided for elections during general election years was
removed.
8 5
To arrive at the conclusion that no tension exists between Arti-
cle VII, section 3 and Article V, section 13(a), and that both sup-
port judicial elections in odd-numbered years, Justice Nix pointed
to Article V, Schedule, Section 288 which extends by one year the
terms of those superior court judges whose terms would end in an
odd-numbered year.8 7 He noted that the Schedule adjusted terms
in the same manner as Article VII, section 3 extended the terms of
judicial district judges to conform with the odd-numbered year
80. Id. (citing Barbieri v. Shapp, 470 Pa. 463, 368 A.2d 721 (1977), and Barbieri v.
Thornburgh, 42 Pa. Commw. 1, 400 A.2d 653 (1979)).
81. Cavanaugh, 497 Pa. at 361, 440 A.2d at 1385 (emphasis in original).
82. Id. The "as circumstances may require" language of Article VII, § 3 first appeared
in the 1909 Amendment to Article VIII, § 3. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 361, 440 A.2d at 1385-86. Justice Nix also asserted that Article VII, § 3
"even provided an extension for then existing terms which would expire in odd-numbered
years to avoid the further necessity of holding elections in even-numbered years." Id. at 361,
440 A.2d at 1386.
85. Id. at 362, 440 A.2d at 1386.
86. Schedule § 2 to Article V provides that the "present terms of all judges of the
Superior Court which would otherwise expire on the first Monday of January in an odd-
numbered year shall be extended to expire in the even-numbered year next following." PA.
CONST. art. V, Schedule § 2. See also supra note 17.
87. Cavanaugh, 497 Pa. at 361-62, 440 A.2d at 1386.
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election requirement."s The dissent criticized the majority for ap-
plying the Article VII, section 3 extension of terms for judges in
the judicial districts, but not judges elected state-wide.
Justice Nix turned his attention to the more recently adopted
Article V,90 and in reviewing the rules of constitutional interpreta-
tion, he stated that the words should be given their plain meaning
and construed in accordance with the intent of the framers.91
Utilizing this method of interpretation, the dissent found that Ar-
ticle VII, section 3 and Article V, section 13(a) both supported the
public policy that state-wide elections of judges and justices should
only take place in odd-numbered years, and that any other conclu-
sion would be contrary to the public will.2
Justice Nix found further support for his position in Article V,
section 15,' 3 which requires a justice to seek retention in "the mu-
nicipal election immediately preceding the expiration" of the jus-
tice's term of office.9 4 He reasoned that under the majority's hold-
ing, if the new justice is elected in November, 1982,5s and assumes
office in 1983, the new justice's term will expire in January, 1993.96
Therefore, to remain consistent with Article V, section 15, the new
88. Id. The last part of Article VII, § 3 states: "That all judges for the courts of the
several judicial districts holding office at the present time, whose terms of office may end in
an odd-numbered year, shall continue to hold their offices until the first Monday of January
in the next succeeding even-numbered year." PA. CONST. art. VII, § 3.
89. Cavanaugh, 497 Pa. at 362, 440 A.2d at 1386.
90. Id. at 362-63, 440 A.2d at 1386. Article V was adopted as an amendment to the
Pennsylvania Constitution on April 23, 1968. Id. In contrast, the "as circumstances may
require" language of Article VII, § 3 first appeared in 1909. Id. at 361, 440 A.2d at 1385.
91. Id. "A constitution is not to receive a technical or strained construction, but rather
the words should be interpreted in popular, natural and ordinary meaning." Id. (quoting
Commonwealth v. Harmon, 469 Pa. 490, 495, 366 A.2d 895, 897 (1976)). "We start with
certain basic principles of constitutional interpretation. It is a fundamental rule that the
words of a constitution, where plain, must be given their common or popular meaning, for
it is in that sense the voters are assumed to have understood them when they adopted the
constitution." Cavanaugh, 497 Pa. at 363, 440 A.2d at 1386-87 (emphasis in origi-
nal)(quoting Walsh v. Tate, 444 Pa. 229, 237, 282 A.2d 284, 288 (1971)).
92. Cavanaugh, 497 Pa. at 363-64, 440 A.2d at 1386-87. "The people of Pennsylvania,
in adopting Article V, § 13(a), clearly intended from the language of that provision to elect
Supreme Court Justices in the odd-numbered years." Id. at 363, 440 A.2d at 1387.
93. The pertinent part of Article V, § 15(b) states that "[i]f a justice or judge files a
declaration [for retention], his name shall be submitted to the electors. . . at the municipal
election immediately preceding the expiration of the term of office of the justice or judge."
PA. CONST. art. V, § 15(b).
94. Cavanaugh, 497 Pa. at 364 n.7, 440 A.2d at 1387 n.7 (emphasis in original) (quot-
ing Article V, § 15(b)).
95. Justice Zappala, now sitting on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, was indeed
elected in the general election of November, 1982.
96. Cavanaugh, 497 Pa. at 364 n.7, 440 A.2d at 1387 n.7.
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justice would have to seek retention in November, 1991, fourteen
months before the expiration of his term. Consequently, unless
the majority made an "additional exception" and permitted the
retention election in 1992, an even-numbered year, the majority's
"anomaly would be perpetuated as long as the successful successor
remained in office." 98 In light of the parameters set forth in Article
V, section 15, as well as Article V, Schedule, section 2 and Article
V, section 13(a), Justice Nix concluded that the majority's holding
that a state-wide judicial election could occur in an even-numbered
year was contrary to constitutional reality, and therefore, he
dissented."
More recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Sprague v.
Casey 00 attempted to clarify the relationship between Article V,
section 13(a) and Article VII, section 3. The court initially resolved
the issues of whether Sprague had standing,101 whether the doc-
trine of laches barred the suit,102 whether the candidates were
97. Id.
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 365-66, 440 A.2d at 1387-88.
100. 550 A.2d 184 (1988). The supreme court's opinion was written by Chief Justice
Nix, who was joined by Justices Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott, Zappala, and Papadakos. Id.
at 186. Justice Stout did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case. Id. at
195.
101. Id. at 186-87. The respondents contended that Sprague should be denied stand-
ing because he lacked a direct interest in the challenged action. Id. at 187. The court stated
that typically "a party must have an interest in the controversy that is distinguishable from
the interest shared by other citizens." Id. (citation omitted). However, the court considered
Sprague's suit to fall within the confines of the exception which permits controversies to
proceed absent a "substantial, direct, and immediate" interest. Id. (citing Application of
Biester, 487 Pa. 438, 409 A.2d 848 (1979)). The supreme court, relying on Biester, held that
Sprague had standing because if standing were denied, "a large body of governmental activ-
ity would be unchallenged in the courts," and that without granting standing the "election
would otherwise go unchallenged because respondents are directly and beneficially af-
fected." Sprague, 550 A.2d at 187.
102. Id. at 187-89. Addressing the respondent's preliminary objection that the equita-
ble doctrine of laches applied, the court stated that "[Iaches bars relief when the com-
plaining party is guilty of want of due diligence in failing to promptly institute the action to
the prejudice of another." Id. at 187 (citation omitted). The respondents claimed that
Sprague, an attorney familiar with the Pennsylvania Constitution, received actual or con-
structive notice of the elections over six and one-half months before instituting his law suit.
Id. at 188. In concluding that Sprague did in fact use reasonable diligence, the court noted
that respondents, as attorneys and candidates for judicial office, were also presumed to have
knowledge of the constitution. Id. The opinion found that respondents could not use the
equitable defense of laches when they had failed to diligently raise the same legal and fac-
tual issues about the legality of the elections as presented by Sprague. Id. In addition, the
decision placed great importance on the fact that the defense of laches should never prevent
the court's consideration of a constitutional challenge. Id. at 188-89 (citing Wilson v. Phila-
delphia School Dist., 328 Pa. 225, 195 A. 90 (1937) and Commonwealth v. Gilligan, 195 Pa.
1989 Judicial Elections 571
prejudiced by Sprague's delay in filing suit,10 3 and whether Justice
Stout and Judge Melinson were indispensable parties.104 The pri-
mary issue before the supreme court was whether judicial elections
to fill the vacancies on the supreme and superior courts could be
held in the general election of November, 1988, when the vacancies
were created in 1987 by resignations and the seats had been tem-
porarily filled by gubernatorial appointment.
10 5
Chief Justice Nix, writing the opinion for the court,106 started his
analysis by describing the Cavanaugh decision10 7 as an exception
to the "absolute mandate" of Article V, section 13(a). 0 8 The court
determined that Cavanaugh was inapposite and should not control
504, 46 A. 124 (1900)).
103. Sprague, 550 A.2d at 188. The respondents contended that Sprague's delay in
filing suit prejudiced the candidates who had already expended considerable time, money
and effort. Id. The prejudice rule only applies as a defense when the complaining party
relied upon the delay, not when the party takes action before the belated suit has com-
menced. Id. (citing Leedom v. Thomas, 473 Pa. 193, 202, 373 A.2d 1329, 1333 (1977)).
Therefore, the court disregarded the respondent's prejudice claim, reasoning that the candi-
dates committed themselves to the campaign when made aware of the election and not
solely in reliance of Sprague's lack of action. Sprague, 550 A.2d at 188. In conclusion, the
court stated that "prejudice can never be permitted to amend the Constitution." Id. (citing
Wilson v. Philadelphia School Dist., 328 Pa. 225, 195 A. 90 (1937) and Commonwealth v.
Gilligan, 195 Pa. 504, 46 A. 124 (1900)).
104. Sprague, 550 A.2d at 189-90. The respondents also raised the preliminary objec-
tion that Sprague failed to join as indispensable parties Justice Juanita Kidd Stout, of the
supreme court, and Judge James R. Melinson, of the superior court. Id. at 189. The respon-
dents contended that Justice Stout and Judge Melinson, the individuals appointed to the
judicial seats available in the contested elections, were indispensable parties with a direct
interest in the controversy because if Sprague prevailed, the two judicial appointees' terms
would be extended beyond the expiration date of their commission from the Governor. Id.
The court concluded that neither Justice Stout nor Judge Melinson were indispensable par-
ties since the controversy did not threaten to shorten the length of their judicial appoint-
ment and any extension of their terms, if Sprague prevailed on the merits, could not be
considered adverse to Justice Stout's and Judge Melinson's interests. Id. at 189-90. In re-
sponse to the question of whether the judicial appointments would remain valid, the court
concluded that if Sprague "is correct on the merits, it will affect only the duration of the
appointments, not the validity of the Governor's act of making them." Id. at 190.
105. Id. at 190. Governor Casey appointed Justice Stout to fill the supreme court va-
cancy and Judge Melinson to fill the superior court seat. Id.
106. Id. at 186. The supreme court's decision was issued subsequent to its per curiam
order of September 27, 1988, 548 A.2d 249, granting Sprague's request for summary relief
and ordering the Secretary of the Commonwealth to remove the judicial candidates from the
November, 1988, general election ballot. Sprague, 550 A.2d at 186.
107. See supra notes 61-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Cavanaugh
decision. The Cavanaugh court held that a seat on the state supreme court which would
become available in the odd-numbered year of 1983 by the natural expiration of a 21 year
term, could be filled in the general election of 1982, an even-numbered year. Cavanaugh v.
Davis, 497 Pa. 351, 357-58, 440 A.2d 1380,. 1383-84 (1982).
108. Sprague, 550 A.2d at 190 (emphasis added).
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the disposition of Sprague's suit, not only because of the factual
distinctions between the two cases,"0 9 but also because the applica-
tion of Cavanaugh would amount to a total disregard of constitu-
tional direction. 1 0 In addition, the court found that the concern of
Cavanaugh, that a term would expire in an odd-numbered year
and require elections in an even-numbered year, was not legiti-
mately present because a proper constitutional interpretation of
the present case would have the new judicial terms expiring in
even-numbered years,"
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court pointed out that when a judi-
cial vacancy arises before the expiration of a full term, the direc-
tive of Article V, section 13(b) requires that the unexpired term
"shall be filled by appointment by the Governor. 1" 2 Chief Justice
Nix interpreted what he considered the explicit language of section
13(b) as setting the maximum length of the judicial appointee's
term of office and requiring the governor to fill the judicial vacancy
by appointment." s The constitution does not give the governor the
freedom to determine when judicial elections would be held or the
length of time appointees would serve on the bench."" Therefore,
the Sprague court concluded that the only discretionary power the
governor possessed under Article V was selecting the individual to
appoint to the vacant judicial position." 5
109. Id. at 191-92. Sprague involved vacancies created by the resignations of the
elected judicial officers before the completion of their terms. Id. at 190. Cavanaugh dealt
with a case where a vacancy was created by the natural expiration of the term of a sitting
supreme court justice who chose not to seek retention. Cavanaugh, 497 Pa. at 353, 440 A.2d
at 1381.
110. Sprague, 550 A.2d at 191. "The interjection of the Cavanaugh issue in the factual
matrix now before us can only be accomplished by a strained interpretation of constitu-
tional intent and a disregard of an unambiguous constitutional direction." Id.
111. Id. at 192.
112. Id. (quoting PA. CONST. art. V, § 13(b)). Article V, § 13(b) also provides that
"[tihe person so appointed shall serve for a term ending on the first Monday of January
following the next municipal election more than ten months after the vacancy occurs or for
the remainder of the unexpired term, whichever is less." PA. CONST. art. V, § 13(b).
113. Sprague, 550 A.2d at 191. Section 13(b) requires that a governor's judicial ap-
pointee shall serve for the lesser of: the remainder of the unexpired term; or the "January
following the next municipal election more than ten months after the vacancy occurs." PA.
CONST. art. V, § 13(b).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 191-92. The court differentiated between the "vacancy" situation of
Sprague and the "no vacancy" issue presented in Cavanaugh. Id. at 191. A "vacancy" oc-
curs, as in the Sprague factual pattern, when a jurist resigns before the completion of his or
her term. Id. at 190. On the other hand, a "no vacancy" situation arises when a judge serves
out his entire term, but does not seek retention. Cavanaugh v. Davis, 497 Pa. 351, 353, 440
A.2d 1380, 1381 (1982). The Sprague court found that the language of Article V, § 13(b)
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In determining when Article V, section 13(b) mandates that the
gubernatorial appointees' terms end and the judicial seats be filled
by election, Chief Justice Nix calculated that the first municipal
election available, greater than ten months after the positions were
prematurely vacated by resignations, was in November of 1989.116
Conversely, if the judicial appointees continued to hold office for
the rest of the unexpired term, Judge Melinson would have served
until January, 1990, and Justice Stout would have served until
January, 1992.117 Therefore, under section 13(b)'s mandate that an
appointment shall last until the earlier of either the next munici-
pal election or the remainder of the unexpired term,118 Chief Jus-
tice Nix held that the new terms of office for both judicial posi-
tions must commence in January of 1990, and the elections to fill
the seats must be conducted during the municipal elections of
1989.119 The Sprague decision also held that, as a matter of law,
the governor's interim appointments of Justice Stout and Judge
Melinson must be extended to the first Monday of January,
1990.120
The Sprague court found it necessary to elaborate on and clarify
the sui generis quality of the 1982 Cavanaugh decision.121 The
court emphasized that the Cavanaugh decision resolved the prob-
lem created by the expiration of former Chief Justice O'Brien's
twenty-one year term in 1983.112 However, because the 1968
applied only in those instances where a "vacancy" existed. Sprague, 550 A.2d at 192.
116. Id. Former Justice Hutchinson resigned effective October 16, 1987 and former
Judge Wickersham resigned from the superior court on March 8, 1987. Id. at 190.
117. Id. at 192 n.5. Thus, an election to fill the superior court seat would have taken
place in the municipal election of November, 1989 and the supreme court election would
have occurred in the municipal election of November, 1991. Id.
118. See supra note 32 and accompanying text for the controlling language of Article
V, § 13(b).
119. Sprague, 550 A.2d at 192. The court's holding would establish that the ten year
terms of the jurists would begin and end in even-numbered years, and require that elections
for a new term be held in odd-numbered, municipal election years, as mandated by Article
V, 13(a) and (b). Id.
120. Id. The supreme court, undoubtedly aware that Justice Stout would reach the
mandatory retirement age of 70 before her appointed term expired in January of 1990,
stated that if the appointee could not complete the interim term, then under Article V, §
13(c) the seat would remain vacant until the new term commenced. Id. at 192 n.7. Article V,
13(c) provides that "[iun the case of a vacancy occurring at the expiration of an appointive
term under section 13(b), the vacancy shall be filled by election as provided in section
13(a)." PA. CONST. art. V, § 13(c).
121. Id. at 194. Sui generis is defined as "of its own kind or class; i.e., the only one of
its own kind; peculiar." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1286 (1979) (emphasis in original).
122. Sprague, 550 A.2d at 194. Presently, justices and judges are elected for ten-year
terms. See PA. CONsT. art. V, § 15(a). Thus, all judicial offices can begin in an even-num-
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amendment to the commonwealth's constitution changed the judi-
cial terms from twenty-one to ten years, Cavanaugh presented a
unique problem since Justice O'Brien's term was the only remain-
ing twenty-one year term to end in an odd-numbered year. 2 '
Thus, the Sprague court clarified the sui generis quality of the
Cavanaugh decision and established that all future judicial elec-
tions shall be held in odd-numbered years, as mandated by the
Pennsylvania Constitution.""
III. CHIEF JUSTICE Nix's ACTIVE ROLE IN INTERPRETING THE
ELECTION CLAUSES
Chief Justice Nix played a leadership role in the evolution of
case law concerning whether state-wide judicial elections in Penn-
sylvania were constitutionally required to be held in odd-num-
bered years during municipal elections. 12 5 In Barbieri I, a plurality
of the supreme court held that under section 2 of the Schedule to
Article V, 126 superior court Judge Cercone's ten year term should
be extended one year to allow his retention election be held in
1979, an odd-numbered year. 2 7 Although Justice Nix agreed with
the plurality's conclusion that a one year extension was necessary,
he cautioned that section 2 of the Schedule alone could not author-
ize the court to extend a judicial term, absent the need for an or-
derly transition to the recently created system of judicial
retention.
28
bered year and end in an even-numbered year, with elections held in the prior odd-num-
bered year. See Sprague, 550 A.2d at 194.
123. Id. Under the one of a kind scenario presented by O'Brien's term, the supreme
court in Cavanaugh decided to permit a state-wide judicial election to be held in an even-
numbered year. However, the Sprague court held that "the Cavanaugh Court was not
presented with a precedent setting issue but merely the adjustment of one term of office so
that it would fall within the scheme clearly mandated under Article V." Id.
124. Id. The court also reiterated the policy that judicial elections be held in odd-
numbered years so that the voting public could concentrate on selecting qualified candidates
for judicial office, without that distractions that accompany a general election year race for
governor, U.S. Senator, or President. Id.
125. See Barbieri v. Shapp, 470 Pa. 463, 470-77, 368 A.2d 721, 725-29 (1977)(Nix, J.,
concurring); Barbieri v. Shapp, 476 Pa. 513, 524-31, 383 A.2d 218, 224-27 (1978)(Manderino,
J., dissenting, joined by Nix, J.); Cavanaugh v. Davis, 497 Pa. 351, 358-66, 440 A.2d 1380,
1384-88 (1982)(Nix, J., dissenting); and Sprague, 550 A.2d 184 (Nix, C.J., majority opinion).
126. See supra note 17 for the language of Article V, Schedule, § 2.
127. Barbieri I, 470 Pa. at 469, 368 A.2d at 724-25 (Jones, C.J., plurality opinion).
Judge Cercone was elected to a ten year term on the Pennsylvania Superior Court in 1968
and assumed office in 1969; thus, his term would expire in 1979 and require a retention
election in 1978, an even-numbered year. Id. at 465, 368 A.2d at 722.
128. Id. at 470, 368 A.2d at 725 (Nix, J., concurring). Prior to the 1968 amendments to
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The Pennsylvania Constitution requires that retention elections
be held "at the municipal election immediately preceding the expi-
ration of the term of office of the justice or judge."' 29 Justice Nix
contended in Barbieri I that the intent of the framers of Article V,
section 15(b), the judicial retention amendment, was to adjust all
judicial terms to conform with the requirement that retention elec-
tions, as well as elections for vacant judicial seats, occur during the
municipal elections in odd-numbered years. 30 Therefore, the plu-
rality was correct in ordering that Judge Cercone's term should be
extended one year to allow his retention election to occur during
the 1979 municipal election.'' However, Justice Nix warned that
the section 2 Schedule did not empower the supreme court to ex-
tend a judicial term, except when necessary to conform with the
constitutional mandate that retention elections take place during
municipal elections. 13 2 Thus, from the court's first case reviewing
the constitutional provisions controlling the state-wide election of
judges, Chief Justice Nix took the position that the constitutional
framers intended, and the language of the constitution supported,
holding all judicial elections during odd-numbered municipal elec-
tion years.
In Barbieri II, the majority of the supreme court held that be-
cause the constitution favored election of judges over appoint-
ments by the governor, the ten month rule of Article V, section
13(b)133 would not prohibit a judicial election in a municipal year
to fill a vacancy created by a foreseeable event, such as mandatory
the commonwealth's constitution, when a judge's term was expiring the judge had to com-
pete against other candidates in a traditional election for a new term in office. Id. With the
passage of Article V, § 15(b), a judge only has to run in a retention election where the judge
may be retained for another full term if a majority of the electorate vote in favor of him or
her. See PA. CONST. art. V, § 15(b).
129. Id. (emphasis added).
130. Barbieri 1, 470 Pa. at 475-76, 368 A.2d at 728. See also PA. CONST. art. V, § 13(a).
131. Id.
132. Id. The court stated:
A literal reading of the language employed in the Court's opinion would suggest that
any term hereinafter commencing subsequent to the effective date of the amend-
ments is subject to modification under Section 2. It is obvious that the framers of the
Schedule did not intend for this provision to authorize such sweeping judicial inter-
ference with all future terms of the Judges of the Superior Court.
Id.
133. "A vacancy in the office of justice, judge or justice of the peace shall be filled by
appointment of the Governor." PA. CONST. art. V, § 13(b). "The person so appointed shall
serve for a term ending on the first Monday of January following the next municipal elec-
tion more than ten months after the vacancy occurs...." Id. (emphasis added).
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retirement."" Justice Nix joined Justice Manderino's dissenting
opinion which took issue with the majority's attempt to distinguish
between vacancies created by mandatory retirement and those
which arise from death, resignation, or voluntary retirement.13 5
The dissent argued that the plain meaning of the word "vacancy"
in section 13(b) encompassed all judicial seats that were vacated
before the natural expiration of a ten year term on the first Mon-
day in January.13 6 Thus, under the interpretation of Justices
Manderino and Nix, all vacancies must be filled by gubernatorial
appointment, and the appointees are required under section 13(b)
to serve until "the next municipal election more than ten months
after the vacancy occurs.''137 Throughout the dissenting opinion,
the analysis which Justice Nix endorsed was conducted under the
assumption that the election to fill a judicial vacancy had to occur
during a municipal election year, and elections during a general
election year were not a constitutionally available option.' 8
Justice Nix, in his lone dissent in Cavanaugh, contended that
the majority was in error for attempting to justify a state-wide ju-
dicial election during the general election of 1982.19 He inter-
134. Barbieri v. Shapp, 476 Pa. 513, 383 A.2d 218, 222 (1978). The majority reasoned
that the gubernatorial appointment power of Article V, § 13(b) was intended to be utilized
only when a judicial seat unexpectedly fell vacant. Id. The majority labeled mandatory re-
tirement an anticipated event creating a fixed term of office, similar to the expected comple-
tion of a judge's elected term, which readily allowed preparation to fill the seat through the
electorial process. Id.
135. Id. at 524-27, 383 A.2d at 224-25.
136. Id. at 525-26, 383 A.2d at 225. "The fact that the retirement date may be calcu-
lated with certainty does not change the character of the opening thereby created. It re-
mains a vacancy to be filled pursuant to Section 13(b)." Id. (emphasis in original).
137. Id. at 529, 383 A.2d at 226 (quoting PA. CONST. art. V, § 13(b)). If less than ten
months exists between the date of resignation and the next municipal election, the governor
may still appoint someone to the bench, but that appointee's term will continue beyond the
current municipal election, and henceforth, two more years until the January following the
next municipal election. Id.
138. Id. at 524-31, 383 A.2d at 224-27. The dissent considered the majority's holding
that foreseeable vacancies could be filled by election and speculated on the practical impact
of the court's decision. Id. at 529-30, 383 A.2d at 226.
For example, because 1977 is a 'municipal election' year, and because the next 'mu-
nicipal election' year does not occur until 1979 (1978 being a 'general election' year)
see Pa. Const. Art. 7, Sections 2 and 3, all 'vacancies' that are certain to occur be-
tween now [February of 1978] and ten months before the municipal election in 1979
are to be filled at the 'next preceding municipal election.' Elections would have to be
held in 1977, not only for foreseeable vacancies which will occur during 1978, but also
for those which will occur in 1979 more than ten months prior to the municipal elec-
tion of that year.
Id. (emphasis added).
139. Cavanaugh v. Davis, 497 Pa. 351, 440 A.2d 1380, 1384-88 (1982). The majority in
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preted Article VII, section 3140 as a general provision addressing
the election of public official, and argued that the language of the
more recently passed Article V, section 13(a) "specifically man-
dated that justices of the Supreme Court . . . be elected in odd
years."14 Thus, Justice Nix took the position that a clear constitu-
tional mandate existed from the 1968 changes to the Pennsylvania
Constitution which required that all judicial elections take place in
odd-numbered years during municipal elections.
142
The importance of Chief Justice Nix's role in formulating a con-
stitutional interpretation of judicial elections culminated in his
majority opinion in Sprague.'" There, Chief Justice Nix concluded
that the explicit language of Article V, section 13(b) created a clear
constitutional mandate that the new judicial terms, necessitated by
resignations, must begin in January of an even-numbered year, fol-
lowing the municipal election in an odd-numbered year. " In addi-
tion, the decision stated unequivocally that "[h]enceforth, all judi-
cial elections shall be held during the municipal election as
prescribed by Article V, section 13(b), of our Constitution."' 45 Fi-
nally, Chief Justice Nix went to great lengths to explain why the
Cavanaugh decision did not control the issue at hand, '4 and fur-
ther limited any future reliance on that case by discussing it sui
generis quality.
47
Chief Justice Nix has played an important and consistent role in
the supreme court's interpretation of judicial elections under the
commonwealth's constitution.' 48 His position on the election issues
has exhibited an attempt to hold in the highest regard the inten-
tion of the framers of the judiciary amendments to the 1968 Con-
Cavanaugh held that the seat of Chief Justice O'Brien, whose 21 year term was ending in
January of 1983, could be filled by the general election of 1982. Id at 357, 440 A.2d at 1383.
140. See supra note 10 for the specific language of Article VII, § 3.
141. Cavanaugh, 497 Pa. at 360, 440 A.2d at 1385 (emphasis in original).
142. Id. at 365-66, 440 A.2d at 1387-88. "To ignore Article V, § 13(a) in favor of an
inferred exception stemming from Article VII, § 3 would ignore fundamental precepts that
the specific must have preference over the general and that a later pronouncement is given
priority over earlier pronouncements." Id.
143. Sprague v. Casey, 550 A.2d 184, 186 (1988). For a listing of the justices joining
Chief Justice Nix's opinion, see supra note 100.
144. Id. at 192. Thus, the victors in the municipal election of 1989 would assume their
judicial posts in January of 1990. Id. The supreme court had previously entered a per
curiam order removing the offices of supreme court justice and superior court judge from
the 1988 general election ballot. 548 A.2d 249.
145. Sprague, 550 A.2d at 194.
146. Id. at 190-91, 192-93.
147. Id. at 194.
148. See supra note 125.
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stitution. 49 In examining the supreme court's ability to alter judi-
cial terms and election schedules, he has cautioned that the court's
power must be strictly confined within the parameters set forth by
the constitution.'50 The position of Chief Justice Nix has also been
unwavering that Article V, sections 13 and 15 create a clear consti-
tutional "mandate" requiring all state-wide judicial elections, re-
gardless of the circumstances, to be held in odd-numbered years
during municipal elections. 5"
From authoring the lone dissent in Cavanaugh,'52 Chief Justice
Nix wrote an essentially unanimous opinion for the court in
Sprague. 53 There, the chief justice convinced his brethren that the
framers of Article V, section 13(b) intended, and its language re-
quired, that all state-wide judicial elections be held during the mu-
nicipal elections in odd-numbered years. 54 By essentially turning
his dissenting opinion in Cavanaugh into the majority opinion in
Sprague, Chief Justice Nix was undoubtedly tempted to overrule
Cavanaugh outright, but instead was satisfied to completely distin-
guish the case by discussing its sui generis quality. 55 The Sprague
opinion specified that the Cavanaugh decision resolved a unique
problem created by a supreme court justice's twenty-one year term
ending in an odd-numbered year, and because all twenty-one year
judicial terms had now expired, the Cavanaugh decision "provides
149. Barbieri v. Shapp, 470 Pa. 463, 368 A.2d 721, 728 (1977)(the court's extension of a
superior court judge's term by one year was consistent with the framer's intent that all
superior court judges seek retention only at municipal elections in odd-numbered years);
Cavanaugh v. Davis, 497 Pa. 351, 440 A.2d 1380, 1387 (1982)(in approving Article V, § 13(a),
the citizens of Pennsylvania clearly intended that all judicial elections take place in odd-
numbered years). See also Barbieri v. Shapp, 476 Pa. 513, 383 A.2d 218, 225, 227
(1978)(quoting the statements of delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1967-68).
150. See Barbieri 1, 470 Pa. at 471-72, 368 A.2d at 726 (the court would not have the
authority to extend any judicial terms under Article V, Schedule § 2, but for the fact that an
extension was necessary to conform with the concept of judicial retention under Article V, §
15(b)); Barbieri H, 476 Pa. at 529-31, 383 A.2d at 226-27 (the court lacks the power to order
judicial elections for vacancies created by mandatory retirement when the language of Arti-
cle V, § 13(a) clearly requires that all vacancies must be filled by judicial appointment);
Cavanaugh, 497 Pa. at 358-59, 440 A.2d at 1384 (the majority lacked the authority to ap-
prove a judicial election in an even-numbered year when the constitution clearly mandated
that the election of judges only occur in odd-numbered years).
151. Cavanaugh, 497 Pa. at 358-59, 440 A.2d at 1384-85. For a detailed discussion of
Justice Nix's lone dissent in Cavanaugh, see supra notes 75-99 and accompanying text.
152. Cavanaugh, 440 A.2d at 1384-88.
153. See supra note 100.
154. Sprague v. Casey, 550 A.2d 184, 194 (1988). See supra note 145 and accompany-
ing text.
155. Sprague, 550 A.2d at 191, 194.
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no authority beyond the holding in that specific case. '
IV. ISSUES UNRESOLVED AFTER Sprague
The most obvious issue to consider in light of the Sprague opin-
ion is whether Governor Casey may appoint someone to complete
Justice Stout's term after she reaches the mandatory retirement
age of 70 in March of 1989, when in fact Justice Stout herself was
appointed to the supreme court after Justice Hutchinson resigned
from his elected position.1 57 The language of Article V, section
13(c) indicates that if a vacancy occurs at the "expiration of an
appointive term" the vacancy would be filled at the next municipal
election. 58 Presuming that mandatory retirement falls within the
term "expiration," Justice Stout's seat would remain vacant until
the victor of the 1989 judicial election assumes office in January of
1990. This conclusion appears consistent with Chief Justice Nix's
opinion in Sprague which warned that if some "impediment" de-
veloped to prevent an appointee from completing an interim term,
the seat would remain vacant until the new term commenced.
159
Although Chief Justice Nix avoided mentioning Justice Stout by
name, a strong indication exists from the Sprague opinion that a
plain reading of the Pennsylvania Constitution prevents Governor
Casey from appointing anyone to complete Justice Stout's interim
term."160 Thus, the seat will be vacant from March of 1989 until the
candidate selected by the voters in the 1989 municipal election can
assume office in January of 1990.11a
Another critical issue left unresolved by the Sprague decision
156. Id.
157. Justice Stout's seat on the court was to be filled by the winner of the cancelled
1988 general election, and her term was automatically extended until January, 1990 by the
Sprague decision. Id. at 192.
158. PA. CONST. art. V, § 13(c). For a quotation of the applicable § 13(c) language, see
supra note 120.
159. Sprague, 550 A.2d at 192 n.7. The Sprague court specifically stated that the ap-
pointees' terms, which were to be filled by the cancelled 1988 elections, would be extended,
by operation of law, until January of 1990. Id at 192.
160. Chief Justice Nix specifically stated that "[i]f some impediment arises during the
appointed term that would prevent the appointee from completing that term, it is to be
noted that the balance of the interim term must remain vacant until the new term com-
mences." Id. at 192 n.7 (emphasis added). A plain reading of this language strongly indicates
that an "impediment" would include mandatory retirement.
161. Professor Ledewitz reached the opposite conclusion when he stated, without elab-
oration, that: "I presume that [Justice Stout's) retirement will create another vacancy, to be
filled by another interim appointment, which still will run until January 1990." Ledewitz,
Judicial Election Questions Left Unanswered By Justices, 11 PA. L.J. RPTR. No. 46 at 3-4
(Dec. 5, 1988) [hereinafter Ledewitz].
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concerns whether Justice Stephen Zappala's seat will require a ju-
dicial election to be held in the general election year of 1992, since
he was elected in 1982 to a ten year term which commenced in
1983.162 Because the Sprague opinion has limited the Cavanaugh
case's applicability to judicial terms of twenty-one years, the Cava-
naugh holding appears unavailable to justify allowing a ten year
judicial term to be renewed or filled in an even-numbered year.""
In addition, Chief Justice Nix has apparently established an abso-
lute rule that "[h]enceforth, all judicial elections shall be held dur-
ing the municipal election.""' Therefore, the Sprague opinion ap-
pears to preclude a state-wide judicial election in 1992 to
determine the fate of Justice Zappala's seat.
Presuming the constitution requires both retention elections' 6
and new judicial elections 6 ' to take place in an odd-numbered
year, the issue becomes whether Justice Zappala's retention elec-
tion should be held a year early, in 1991, or a year later, in 1993.167
The supreme court could choose to shorten Justice Zappala's term
by one year and hold the election for his seat in 1991, with the new
term commencing in 1992. This would forever break the cycle of an
even-numbered year election and require all future elections for
the Zappala seat to occur during municipal elections, as mandated
by the constitution. 18 The supreme court, however, appears unable
to shorten the ten year term of a duly elected member of the state
supreme court without a constitutional justification, and none ap-
pears available. 169 Consequently, scheduling an election in 1991,
162. Justice Zappala was the victor of the 1982 election which was authorized by the
Cavanaugh decision.
163. See Sprague, 550 A.2d at 194. "Notwithstanding the language of the majority
opinion in Cavanaugh, its sui generis quality must be recognized and therefore that decision
provides no authority beyond the holding in that specific case." Id.
164. Id. (emphasis added).
165. Article V, § 15(b) provides that the name of a justice seeking retention shall be
submitted to the electorate for approval by the majority "at the municipal election immedi-
ately preceding the expiration of the term of office." PA. CONST. art. V, § 15(b) (emphasis
added).
166. Article V, § 13(a) requires that new justices "shall be elected at the municipal
election next preceding the commencement of their respective terms of office." PA. CONST.
art. V, § 13(a) (emphasis added).
167. The same issue would exist if Justice Zappala retired in 1993, at the end of his
ten year term, and an election was scheduled to select his successor.
168. See Article V, § 13(a) and § 15(b).
169. See Barbieri v. Shapp, 470 Pa. 463, 368 A.2d 721, 728-29 (1977)(Nix, J., concur-
ring). Justice Nix implied that constitutional authority was required before the court may
shorten the length of a judicial term when he stated that "[a] constitutional provision estab-
lishing a fixed term of office encompasses an implied prohibition against extending the term,
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with a new term for Justice Zappala's seat commencing in 1992,
does not seem to be a viable alternative.
A second alternative would be for the supreme court to leave
Justice Zappala's term at ten years, but still order a retention elec-
tion, or a new election if retention is not sought, in 1991. The lan-
guage of Article V, section 13(a) and section 15(b) states that the
election should occur in the municipal election "preceding" the
conclusion of the term of office.1"" Therefore, a constitutional
ground exists for scheduling the election in 1991, preceding the
completion of Justice Zappala's term in January of 1993.171 How-
ever, the court has questioned whether public policy prohibits
holding an election over fourteen months before the term com-
mences and the victor can assume office. 172 In addition, scheduling
a premature election does not resolve the problem that the Zap-
pala seat would continue to end in an odd-numbered year.7M For
public policy reasons and in an effort to end the perpetuation of
the odd-numbered year judicial term, the supreme court should
not hold a retention election in 1991. Instead, the court should
bring the Zappala seat's term into line with the framers' intention
that judicial terms begin and end in even-numbered years and
elections take place during the preceding municipal election.
To honor the constitution's mandate that judicial elections be
held in odd-numbered years and eliminate the problem of a su-
preme court term ending in an odd-numbered year, consideration
should be given to extending Justice Zappala's term by one year, to
and absent specific constitutional authority, no court has the power to increase the constitu-
tionally mandated judicial term of office." Id.
170. See supra note 168.
171. This was the result anticipated by Chief Justice Nix in the Cavanaugh decision
when he criticized the majority for permitting the election to held in 1982. See Cavanaugh v.
Davis, 497 Pa. 351, 364 n.7, 440 A.2d 1380, 1387 n.7 (1982).
172. See Barbieri I, 470 Pa. at 468, 368 A.2d at 724 (citing Commonwealth ex rel.
Barratt v. McAfee, 232 Pa. 36, 45, 81 A. 85, 88 (1911)) ("This extended hiatus [of fourteen
months] between election and assumption of office is contrary to the public policy of
Pennsylvania.").
173. The supreme court should not expect the perpetuation of this problem to resolve
itself when Justice Zappala reaches the mandatory retirement age of 70. Justice Zappala was
born September 26, 1932. Assuming he successfully seeks retention, his new ten year term
would expire in January of 2003; however, he would be forced to retire on September 26,
2002. Under Article V, § 13(b), a gubernatorial appointee would serve out the remainder of
the term, but the new term would still commence in 2003, an odd-numbered year. Conse-
quently, as in the 1980's and the 1990's, the supreme court of the twenty-first century would
again face the issue of whether either an election should be held in 2001 with the victor
taking office in 2003, or an appointee should continue in office until 2004, or the seat should
remain vacant from 2003 to 2004.
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January of 1994, and scheduling the election for 1993.174 This solu-
tion appears consistent with the Sprague decision, where Chief
Justice Nix indicated that Article VII, section 3 could have been
utilized by the Cavanaugh court to extend Chief Justice O'Brien's
term one year so that it ended in an even-numbered year and the
election for his seat could be filled at the municipal election. 175 An
extension of Justice Zappala's term by one year appears consistent
with the intention of the constitution's framers and the under-
standing of the citizens of Pennsylvania in adopting the 1968
Constitution.
Specifically, Article VII, section 3q7' and Article V, Schedule,
section 2177 both make allowances for an extension of a judicial
term to end in an even-numbered year, presumably to conform
with the requirement that judicial elections be held in odd-num-
bered years. Although section 3 is directed to judges of the judicial
districts and Schedule section 2 applies to superior court judges, a
strong inference may be drawn that an extension of a supreme
court justice's term to end in an even-numbered year would be
consistent with the intentions of the constitutional framers and the
overall scheme of the commonwealth's constitution. Thus, it can be
anticipated that sometime before 1992, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court will extend Justice Zappala's term until 1994 and order his
retention election, or an election for his successor, to occur during
the municipal election of 1993.178
Christine M. Dolfi
174. Professor Ledewitz also reached the conclusion that Justice Zappala's term
should be extended. See Ledewitz, supra note 161, at 4.
175. Sprague, 550 A.2d at 194. "Rather than attempting to perpetuate the issue, the
Cavanaugh Court could have employed the vehicle provided for in article VII, section 3 by
holding that the term of Chief Justice O'Brien could have been extended to the 'next suc-
ceeding even-numbered year.'" Id. (citing PA. CONST. art. VII, § 3).
176. See supra note 10.
177. See supra note 17. For cases applying Schedule § 2, see Barbieri v. Shapp, 470
Pa. 463, 368 A.2d 721 (1977). See also Cavanaugh v. Davis, 497 Pa. 351, 440 A.2d 1380,
1384-88 (1982)(Nix, J., dissenting).
178. As Chief Justice Nix succinctly stated: "Henceforth, all judicial elections shall be
held during the municipal election as prescribed by Article V, section 13(b), of our Constitu-
tion." Sprague, 550 A.2d at 194.
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